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Voluntarist Theology at the Origins of Modern Science: 
A Response to Peter Harrison 
[History of Science, 47 (2009), pp. 79-113.] 
 
There is a historiographical tradition which links two different theological approaches 
to God’s creation of the world (and his subsequent relationship to it) with 
correspondingly opposed attitudes to the most reliable scientific epistemology. These 
two approaches are usually referred to as voluntarist and intellectualist theology. The 
beginnings of this historiographical tradition can be traced back to the 1930s with the 
appearance of a series of three papers by the philosopher and theologian Michael 
Beresford Foster (1903-1959), published in the philosophical journal, Mind, and the 
appearance in 1936 of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s “Study of the History of an Idea”, The 
Great Chain of Being.
1
 Foster drew attention to the role of what he called voluntarist 
theology in the rise of science in the early modern period, and attributed this to the 
encouragement voluntarism provided for empiricist approaches to an understanding of 
the natural world. Lovejoy’s Great Chain of Being, by contrast, focussed on the 
theological approach to which Foster’s voluntarism was opposed, and which is 
usually called “intellectualist”. Although failing to reach the heights, in terms of 
influence, that Robert K Merton’s Science, technology and society in seventeenth-cen-
tury England of 1938 went on to enjoy, among those interested in the relations 
between science and religion the voluntarism and science thesis has proved as 
enduring as the Puritanism and science thesis.
2
  
 
But it has been under a notice to quit from Peter Harrison since the appearance of his 
“Voluntarism and early modern science”, in 2002.3 What I want to do in this paper, 
 2 
therefore, is to attempt to re-affirm, contrary to Harrison’s claims, that voluntarist 
theology was an important component, or at least concomitant, of the natural 
philosophy of some of the leading thinkers of the early modern period. But the first 
thing to do is to say a few words about what is meant by intellectualist and voluntarist 
theologies.  
 
Intellectualist versus Voluntarist Theologies 
 
The differentiation between these two approaches to the nature of God’s Providence, 
the nature of his relationship to the world, can be seen to originate among the Early 
Fathers, but it is usually regarded as a feature of theology in the Middle Ages, 
beginning perhaps with Peter Damiani (1007-1072), whose Disputation on whether 
God is omnipotent of about 1067 is seen as a clarion call for voluntarists, and Peter 
Abelard (1079-1142), whose Introduction to theology, written about fifty years later,  
reached conclusions that are now seen as representative of intellectualist theology.
4
  
 
Put simply, the rivalry between these two theological perspectives derived from 
differing views about the competence of the newly recovered Aristotelian philosophy 
in underwriting Christian theology.
5
 The dangers of the philosophical approach were 
all too often seen in conclusions that seemed to deny the omnipotence of God. The 
major illustration of this is provided by the condemnation of various Aristotelian 
propositions by the Bishop of Paris in 1277. The list of proscribed propositions 
included many which used philosophical assumptions to deny God’s ability to 
perform physical operations, such as moving the whole world system two feet to the 
left, or creating a vacuum.
6
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Etienne Tempier, the Bishop of Paris, simply wished to reject the relevance of 
Aristotelian philosophizing to any questions about what God could or could not do. 
But there had already been discussions of the nature of God’s omnipotency within 
Christian theology in which it was generally acknowledged that God’s omnipotency 
could not be threatened, or undermined, by pointing out that he could not do 
something which was logically impossible—such as claiming that he could not create 
a married bachelor. Similarly, these discussions dismissed paradoxical claims that he 
was incapable of creating a weight so heavy that he himself could not lift it. 
Nevertheless, these discussions, pacé Tempier, seemed to some to allow Aristotelian 
philosophical conclusions to be applied to God’s creation without undermining God’s 
omnipotence. If Aristotle said creation of a vacuum was impossible then it did not 
undermine God’s omnipotence to say God could not create a vacuum—for these 
thinkers it was as though creation of a vacuum was not simply a physical 
impossibility, but a logical impossibility. Others, however, especially after the 
condemnation of 1277, begged to differ. For these dissenters their rivals, the 
intellectualist theologians, placed too much emphasis upon logic in determining God’s 
actions. Consequently, they insisted that God did things not according to his reason 
but to his will.  
 
Now, the point of this was not to insist that God did things in an irrational way, but 
merely to ensure that supposedly logically-driven conclusions did not get out of hand. 
The fear was that Aristotelian logic would lead to conclusions about God which either 
diminished his omnipotence, or more subtly, which implied that he was not fully in 
 4 
control of his own actions, because he always had to follow fully the dictates of 
reason, and acted, therefore, out of necessity.  
 
In emphasising the role of God’s will in guiding his actions, the point was to suggest 
that God could do as he pleased, and was not constrained by all of the extended range 
of ‘logical’ necessities that their rivals wanted to claim (clearly, they accepted that 
there were logical contradictions that God could not counter, but they would not 
extend these to every one of Aristotle’s philosophical conclusions).7 God’s freedom of 
action was thus upheld. Needless to say, however, there was a wide range of opinions 
about how far to take this emphasis upon the arbitrary will of God. For some it was 
just a way of avoiding an extreme Aristotelianism of the kind shown by Siger of 
Brabant (c. 1240–c. 1283) and Boethius of Dacia (fl. c. 1277), while still supposing 
that God freely chose to act in accordance with Aristotelian logic.
8
 Others, however, 
seemed to take voluntarism itself to extremes, as a way of denying that we could ever 
presume to understand God. William of Ockham (c. 1288–c. 1348) is usually regarded 
as the representative of this kind of voluntarism. For William it was conceding too 
much to the compelling power of philosophy to expect God to conform to his own 
nature, and so William insisted that God could, if he chose, do something that was 
counter to his nature.
9
 
 
Intellectualists, by contrast, saw the emphasis upon God’s freedom of will as having 
dangers of its own. William of Ockham’s claim is a case in point. But even at a less 
extreme level, voluntarism seemed to deny intuitions about what was morally right 
and wrong. Intellectualist theology always took it for granted that God, because of his 
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goodness, always did what was for the best. He was able to decide what was best by 
the use of his reason.  
 
Voluntarists, however, were suspicious of such claims and where they might lead, and 
so they tended to deny that there were pre-existing or eternal principles of right and 
wrong to which God had to conform (again, the concern of the voluntarist is that God 
has no room to manoeuvre but has to conduct himself in accordance with presupposed 
principles of morality). The point of the denial was not to suggest that God acted 
immorally, but that he acted freely, and that the way he acted allows us to determine, 
retrospectively, what we should consider to be right and wrong. But for intellectualists 
this was an outrageous suggestion, implying that anything might be considered good, 
even something evidently devastatingly evil. So, one of the traditional ways of 
characterising the differences between intellectualists and voluntarists is to say that 
the intellectualist believes that God does what is good, but the voluntarist says that 
what God does is good. The first implies that the good is an absolute concept 
independent of God, the latter carries no such implication. 
 
Now, in the historiography of science these two theologies have been linked, 
especially in the early modern period, to different approaches to scientific 
epistemology and methodology. The intellectualist emphasis upon God’s reason is 
seen to go hand-in-hand with rationalist natural philosophies. Since God followed the 
dictates of reason in creating the world, we can reconstruct, so to speak, God’s 
thought processes, and arrive by a rational process at an understanding of the world. 
By contrast, the voluntarist emphasis upon God’s freedom of operation is associated 
with a belief in the radical contingency of the natural world and the concomitant 
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belief that we can only understand God’s creation a posteriori, by examining it and 
drawing empirically-based conclusions as to what he actually did, or as to what kind 
of world he created. 
 
It is this fairly prominent feature of the historiography of early modern science that 
Professor Harrison has attacked and I wish to defend. But one thing we should 
consider before I launch into this is the question as to why early modern natural 
philosophers might have turned to this time-honoured theological debate at all.  
 
Amos Funkenstein pointed to what he called a secular theology which arose in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was developed and promoted chiefly by 
leading natural philosophers, and Funkenstein provided an excellent commentary on 
the way major theological ideas were developed by various of these thinkers, so that, 
as he said, “Never before or after were science, philosophy, and theology seen as 
almost one and the same occupation.” 10 What Funkenstein did not do, however, was 
explain why the thinkers he discussed felt it was so important for them to enter into 
what is often highly recondite theology.  
 
But it seems to me that it isn’t hard to see why. We simply have to bear in mind that 
these new secular theologians are developing new natural philosophies which are 
radically different from scholastic Aristotelianism. But Aristotelian natural philosophy 
has long been regarded as an important handmaiden to the Queen of the Sciences, 
Theology.
11
 In seeking to overthrow Aristotelianism, therefore, the new philosophers 
felt it was incumbent upon them, either to separate natural philosophy from religion, 
or to show how their new philosophy could take over as a better hand-maiden to 
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religion.
12
 This enterprise was especially important given the changes that religion 
itself was undergoing at this time. Aristotelianism was associated with Roman 
Catholicism and some Protestant thinkers at least recognised a need for a new natural 
philosophy to support their new kind of religion.
13
 But perhaps what made the 
enterprise of developing a new secular theology even more urgent was the perceived 
rise of atheism, and the fact that the new philosophies were all too often seen, by the 
devout, as providing support for the atheist worldview.
14
 There was, therefore, a 
determined effort by many of the leading natural philosophers, all of whom seemed to 
have been highly devout, to show the usefulness of their new philosophies for 
combating atheism, and confirming the existence of God.
15
 
 
With regard to voluntarist theology in particular, it might also be supposed that its 
revival was greatly stimulated by the advent of Spinoza, whom Jonathan Israel has 
called “the supreme philosophical bogeyman of early Enlightenment Europe”. 16 
Although Spinoza’s theology is highly original, it can be seen to bear marked 
similarities to intellectualist theology. Indeed, it might be regarded as intellectualist 
theology taken to its logical extreme.
17
 It should be noted, however, that the need to 
choose between voluntarist and intellectualist theologies had already been put on the 
philosophical agenda before Spinoza’s emergence—possibly by the Protestant 
Reformers; possibly (at least as far as natural philosophers were concerned) by 
Descartes.
18
 But the full history of this has yet to be written. 
 
It is against this background, then, that the old distinction between intellectualist and 
voluntarist approaches to understanding God’s Providence re-emerged. Given this 
background, it is my contention that the real concern of the natural philosophers 
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involved is not with the niceties of intellectualism or voluntarism for their own sakes, 
but rather with the best strategy for combating atheism or for showing the 
compatibility of their natural philosophies with whatever religious orthodoxy to which 
they felt most committed.
19
 In other words, they do not always conduct themselves as 
though they are unbendingly committed to voluntarism, or intellectualism, but they 
take a pragmatic line, cutting their cloth to suit the prevailing conditions. This is going 
to have implications for some of Harrison’s strictures against early modern 
voluntarism. 
 
Addressing Aspects of Harrison’s Critique 
 
We read things according to our own lights, so when I first heard of Peter Harrison’s 
rejection of the fairly standard claims about the role of voluntarist theology in early 
modern science, I assumed that he would offer a reconsideration of, and an alternative 
account of, the various controversies which had been characterised by historians as 
disputes over the nature of Providence inspired by voluntarism on the one hand and its 
opposite, intellectualist theology, on the other.
20
 This expectation was based on my 
own work on voluntarist theology in early modern science, in which I had focussed on 
controversies between the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More, who rejected 
voluntarism, and the Presbyterian divine, Richard Baxter, and the natural philosopher, 
Robert Boyle, both of whom upheld it (or so it seemed to me). I’d also looked into the 
controversy between Bishop Edward Stillingfleet and John Locke on the notion of 
thinking matter, although I hadn’t published anything on this.21 What’s more, I was 
able to recognise the theological background to these controversies thanks to work by 
other scholars on the famous controversy between Leibniz, chief exponent of 
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intellectualist theology, and Samuel Clarke, speaking for Isaac Newton, and 
representing the voluntarist side of the debate.
22
 But Harrison’s paper, “Voluntarism 
and Early Modern Science” (2002), stated at the outset that he believed the 
“voluntarism and science thesis is fatally flawed and its major contentions should be 
abandoned.”23 As I began to read it, therefore, I was eager to learn how Harrison 
would interpret the differences between, say, Leibniz and Clarke (the obvious 
example to choose), without recourse to the theological differences represented by 
intellectualism and voluntarism. And, of course, I wondered whether this alternative 
reading would be applicable to the disputes between More and Baxter, and More and 
Boyle, and therefore undermine my own accounts.  
 
Harrison bases his objections on five main difficulties, which he believes undermine 
the standard claims in the historiography of voluntarist theology. Firstly, he suggests 
that there were voluntarists who were not empiricists. Secondly, in his own words, 
“the central categories of ‘voluntarism’, ‘necessity’, and ‘contingency’ are used with 
such imprecision and ambiguity as to render many versions of the thesis virtually 
meaningless.” Thirdly, he suggests that claims about the impact of medieval 
voluntarism on early modern thought are “simply wrong.” Fourthly, he suggests that a 
number of early modern empiricists who are used to support claims about the 
importance of voluntarism “were not voluntarists in any significant sense of [the] 
word.” Finally, he suggests that voluntarism is in fact inconsistent with the physico-
theological motivations of the majority of early modern natural philosophers. These 
difficulties lead him to insist that the “voluntarism and science thesis” is “fatally 
flawed and its major contentions should be abandoned.”24 
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This approach, which draws up a typology of what it means to be a voluntarist, and 
then seeks to determine who fits this typology, seems to me to be too rigid to capture 
the messiness of historical reality. Consider, for example, the fact that while 
presenting the case for his first objection: that there were voluntarists who were not 
empiricists, Harrison concludes that since Descartes was a voluntarist and a 
rationalist, the “inexorability of the logic of a connection between voluntarism and 
empiricism” breaks down.25 There may be intellectual historians out there who have 
talked in terms of the inexorable logic of particular positions, but if there are, I can’t 
imagine them holding this position for long. Indeed, I can imagine myself, or other 
intellectual historians, using the example of Descartes precisely to show that there is 
no necessary connection between voluntarism and empiricism, there is no inexorable 
logic which connects them. Nevertheless, I would want to go on, it remains true to say 
that the defence of empiricist approaches was often associated with a theological 
position that can be characterised as voluntarist. 
 
Although Harrison concedes that Descartes’s position is “idiosyncratic” and certainly 
puzzling, he refuses to allow the validity of claims, notably by Margaret Osler, that 
Descartes was really an intellectualist.
26
 The point here is that Descartes famously 
pronounced that God freely created the so-called eternal truths, such as the truths of 
mathematics, the laws of nature, and so forth, and could have made them different: 2 
plus 2 might have been made equal to 5. This looks voluntarist through and through, 
but Descartes went on to invoke the immutability of God to enable him to insist that 
God could not change the eternal truths. Furthermore, as Gary Hatfield has pointed 
out, Descartes then claimed that God created our minds with innate knowledge of the 
eternal truths that he did create, and so we are able to know the essences of things a 
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priori.
27
 This no longer looks like voluntarism. Voluntarists more typically wish to 
avoid allowing a priori knowledge of the world, which is associated with rationalism 
and (usually) with the view that God was constrained by reason in the act of 
creation.
28
 Once Descartes insists that it is possible to arrive at an understanding of the 
world by a process of pure reasoning, he seems to be conducting himself as an 
intellectualist in his theology, not as a voluntarist. This was Osler’s point and I have 
more sympathy with it than Harrison; after all, as Gary Hatfield has pointed out, 
Descartes does not tell us whether God created the truth of his own immutability.
29
 
Descartes wanted to insist that God has to conform to his own immutability whether 
he wants to or not. This is an eternal truth, it seems, that God could not have made 
different.
30
 Furthermore, it plays an absolutely crucial role in Descartes’s physics, 
allowing Descartes to draw rational conclusions as to how the world must be, because 
God could not have done things differently. 
 
Burt I believe it is wrong to try to reach a determination of this issue—whether 
Descartes was a voluntarist or an intellectualist—in absolute or essentialist terms. As I 
said earlier, always with regard to the intellectual positions adopted by specific 
thinkers, we need to consider the context within which they developed any given 
intellectual position. Hatfield provides an account of Descartes’s discussion of the 
creation of the eternal truths which sees it as an attempt to separate theology from 
philosophy, and thus give Descartes free reign to develop a philosophical system 
which can be non-Aristotelian without thereby being anti-Catholic. I won’t pursue the 
complex details of Hatfield’s argument here, but suffice it to say that it is perfectly 
consistent with the evidence and at least plausible. It provides, therefore, a way of 
understanding why Descartes could write like a voluntarist with regard to one aspect 
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of his philosophy, albeit a highly idiosyncratic voluntarist, and write like an 
intellectualist in all other respects. The Descartes that Hatfield presents was not driven 
by the demands of inexorable logic, but by considerations about how best to persuade 
his learned contemporaries to abandon Aristotelian natural philosophy and to embrace 
his.
31
 We cannot say, therefore, whether Descartes was really a voluntarist or really an 
intellectualist, but given this, we certainly cannot use his example to dismiss all 
claims about the putative intellectual affiliation between voluntarism and empiricism. 
 
Let’s move on to Harrison’s second difficulty, that in the literature on this topic “the 
central categories of ‘voluntarism’, ‘necessity’, and ‘contingency’ are used with such 
imprecision and ambiguity as to render many versions of the thesis virtually 
meaningless.” I don’t want to look in detail at all the points Harrison raises under this 
heading. Many of his points, alas, do point to sloppy thinking in the scholars who 
have tried to discuss these issues. I can’t make excuses for all of these, but suffice it to 
say that if the errors of individual scholars invalidated general arguments, then I could 
invalidate differential calculus just by attempting a few calculations!  
 
As a critic, Harrison is by no means obliged to sort out the correct from the incorrect 
in the historians whose views he is rejecting. However, it is easy to see that some of 
Harrison’s arguments depend not on the inherent lack of cogency of the voluntarist 
thesis, but on his exploitation of the confusions perpetrated by some of its proponents. 
Take the case of occasionalism. As Harrison points out, P. M. Heimann, in his 1978 
paper, “Voluntarism and Immanence” equated voluntarism and occasionalism.32 
Harrison can now take delight in pointing out that “this characterization of 
voluntarism hardly serves the thesis well.” For example, Malebranche, the leading 
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occasionalist, is thoroughly intellectualist in his theology (he is also, of course, a 
Cartesian rationalist). And indeed, Harrison goes on to point out that occasionalism is 
“quite consistent with intellectualism”.33 What Harrison does not point out, however, 
is that, Heimann’s views notwithstanding, occasionalism is intrinsically incompatible 
with voluntarism. The correct response to Heimann’s claim that voluntarism and 
occasionalism go hand in hand is not to conclude that the voluntarism thesis is fatally 
flawed, but that Heimann mistook the implications of voluntarism, or of 
occasionalism.  
 
The point about occasionalism is that it depends on the insistence that the concept of 
secondary causation is somehow incoherent and inconceivable. Only God, therefore, 
is capable of causative action. Any sign of secondary causation, according to the 
occasionalist, is really evidence for the direct intervention of God.
34
 For a 
contemporary voluntarist this is exactly the same as saying that God cannot make 
matter active, or that he cannot make matter capable of thinking.
35
 In short, it is a 
circumscription of God’s omnipotence based on what a human thinker decides to be 
impossible. For the voluntarist, what Malebranche, or any other philosopher, claims 
about the incoherence of secondary causation is beside the point. If God wishes to 
make a moving brick capable in its own right of breaking a glass window, he can. 
God does not have to surreptitiously break the window for the brick, because he lacks 
the wherewithal to make the brick do it itself. For the voluntarist, occasionalism is 
based on a pernicious absurdity (that God has to directly involve himself in absolutely 
everything that happens in the world, no matter how corrupt or degrading), deriving 
from an arrogant proscription of what God can and cannot do.
36
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A similar response could be made to Harrison’s comments about the distinction 
between God’s absolute and ordained power, and the ways in which this distinction 
might or might not have been used in discussions of miracles.
37
 Harrison mingles fair 
comment against sloppy thinking by various scholars, with a stratagem of taking what 
those scholars say as a legitimate representation of voluntarist theology and using it to 
undermine the thesis. By these means Harrison is able to conclude that the 
voluntarism thesis is completely unhelpful because, not just putative voluntarists but 
“virtually all seventeenth-century thinkers held that the creation was… dependent on 
the will of God.”38 Again, I would simply say to this that voluntarism is 
misrepresented here. No voluntarist would have felt the need to insist that the world 
was dependent on the will of God, or we might say, the continued good will of God, 
who could withdraw his support at any time—as Harrison says, this was a universal 
assumption in the Christian tradition. Voluntarists did, however, feel the need to insist 
that with regard to the creative act, God simply did as he willed, or as he wished. The 
point was that God’s will was not constrained to choose a particular kind of creation 
by pre-existing absolute conceptions of what was good, or what was possible 
according to some philosophical position. So, when Isaac Newton wrote of God’s 
“creating, preserving, and governing of all things according to his good will”, he was 
not necessarily invoking voluntarist beliefs, but when he wrote, “The world might 
have been otherwise then it is (because there may be worlds otherwise framed then 
this) Twas therefore noe necessary but a voluntary & free determination that it should 
bee thus”, he almost certainly was.39  
 
Eventually, Harrison comes to the nub of the matter and concedes that it can still be 
asked, even in spite of the example of Descartes (and presumably, although he does 
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not explicitly say so, in spite of all he himself has said up to this point), “whether most 
of those committed to experimental philosophy were voluntarists in the sense that 
they considered God’s creative will not to have been determined by his goodness and 
wisdom.”40  
 
Instead of pointing to infelicities of expression in modern commentators, Harrison 
now points to seemingly intellectualist statements made by supposedly voluntarist  
thinkers.
41
 I want to take here the same line as I did when discussing Descartes earlier. 
Deviation from a standard version of voluntarism by a particular thinker should not 
lead us as historians to suppose they were not in the least influenced by voluntarism, 
but that they had reasons of their own for introducing these qualifications, or for being 
inconsistent with a position they had taken on one or more other occasions. What 
those reasons were could only be determined (if at all) by looking at the local context, 
the thinkers own interests, and the interests of those to whom they might be affiliated 
at the relevant time. It would surely be remarkable, would it not, if every voluntarist 
subscribed to 39 articles of voluntarist theology, or a set of Jesuitical “Rules for 
thinking with the Church, voluntarists, for the use of”, without any room for 
manoeuvre. I couldn’t help thinking, as I read Harrison’s attempts to show how 
various reputed voluntarists were not voluntarists, how easy it is to show that hardly 
anybody was a Puritan, and nobody was a Latitudinarian. And we all know that not 
even Jesus was a Christian, and Newton was never a Newtonian, or if he was, then 
none of the eighteenth-century Newtonians were really Newtonians.
42
 Say what you 
like, these categories and others like them, whether they were conceived and used by 
the alleged members of those categories or not, remain useful to historians. Always, 
however, they must be used with caution. 
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Again, let me take just one example from Harrison’s discussion. Harrison provides a 
brief quotation from one of Newton’s religious manuscripts which he says reveals “an 
unmistakeably intellectualist position”.43 I’ll quote this in the longer version which 
Harrison provides in a subsequent paper of his devoted entirely to Newton’s 
voluntarism. This is from a manuscript entitled “Of the Church” (about 1710): 
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart & with all thy soul & wth 
all thy mind. This is the first & great commandment & the second is like unto 
it: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments, 
saith Christ, hang all the Law & the Prophets, Matt 2.37. And on these two 
also depends all the Gospel. For these are the laws of nature, the essential part 
of religion which ever was and ever will be binding to all nations, being of an 
immutable eternal nature because grounded upon immutable reason.
44
 
 
Harrison glosses this in his Newton paper by saying that moral obligations are said by 
Newton to be grounded in “the revealed commands of God and in the natural order”, 
and says that the laws of nature mentioned here originate from “God’s immutable 
reason.” Of course, I’m a biased reader, but I don’t see any mention of God’s reason 
here, only human reason. We are, after all, talking about commandments which are 
said to be the essential part of religion, and binding on all nations because they are 
grounded upon immutable reason. It seems clear, therefore, that what Newton has in 
mind here are natural laws in the sense of moral laws which are accessible to 
everyone’s reason, and so knowable to members of all nations, not just those fortunate 
enough to be born in Christendom. This notion of natural law has as long a pedigree 
as the concept of laws of nature in physics. So, Newton is saying nothing about 
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physical laws here, and, I would say, nothing about God’s reason. He merely uses the 
term immutable in this context to avoid any suggestion that human reason might be 
said to be different in different cultures (reason he insists “ever was and ever will be 
binding on all nations”). If he is talking about nations, he cannot strictly be laying 
claim to commandments of an eternal nature, and so must mean eternal in a relative 
sense; likewise, immutable should be taken to refer to the immutable nature of what 
passes for reason among humans. 
 
But, I don’t think I need to persuade readers of the truth of my reading. It’s enough for 
my purposes to cast some doubt on Harrison’s claim that this quotation presents “an 
unmistakeably intellectualist position”. Besides, this is only one quotation and there 
are many others which seem to suggest Newton was a voluntarist. Consider the 
quotation I provided earlier (“The world might have been otherwise then it is (because 
there may be worlds otherwise framed then this) Twas therefore noe necessary but a 
voluntary & free determination that it should bee thus”). This comes from one of 
Newton’s alchemical manuscripts and it is by no means clear to me, from the 
immediate context, why Newton wanted to say this at this point, but say it he did. 
 
Returning to the earlier paper on “Voluntarism and early modern science”, Harrison 
next tries to undermine the voluntarist thesis by suggesting that natural philosophers 
are unlikely to subscribe to a view of nature in which God continues to intervene by 
arbitrary decree, and by ‘arbitrary’ Harrison spells out that he means “in the sense of 
capricious or random”.45 Indeed, such a view would make their attempts to establish a 
natural philosophy completely futile. This certainly would be true if voluntarist 
 18 
theology did carry these implications. But Harrison is either attacking a straw man 
here, or at best a misreading of voluntarism perpetrated by less than careful historians.  
 
The whole point of the alleged alliance between voluntarism and empiricism is that it 
is not possible to reconstruct a priori God’s thinking as he decided how to create the 
world. Kepler clearly thought it was possible to think God’s thoughts after him, as did 
Descartes, and Leibniz.
46
 But their assumptions were based on the belief that God was 
constrained to create the world in accordance with the same rational processes 
available to them. Since both Descartes and Leibniz knew that void space was a 
contradiction in terms, because extended substance was matter, they could tell that 
God could not have allowed any vacuum in the world. He had no choice in the matter. 
Similarly, since Henry More knew that matter was by its very nature inert, he could 
confidently conclude that not even God could give matter its own activity. 
Conversely, since immaterial spirit was by its very nature active, and since activity 
was a feature of the physical world, More was able to pronounce with some 
confidence that God had created not only inert bodies, but also active immaterial 
beings.  
 
Those who subscribed to a voluntarist theology, however, denied that God could be 
second-guessed this way. The only way you could tell whether God had allowed void 
space or not was to see if you could find a vacuum, or failing that, to see if you could 
make one. This was the only way you could tell because, according to the voluntarist, 
God could have gone either way on the issue. He had a free choice in the matter. 
God’s creative power was in this sense arbitrary—nobody, as far as I can tell, ever 
said that he created things capriciously and randomly (although, if it is true that 
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William of Ockham believed that God did not have to conform even to his own 
nature, then he could not have denied that God might have behaved this way). 
Similarly, the only way you could tell whether matter could be active or not was to 
empirically investigate bodies, or perhaps to try to isolate an immaterial spirit and to 
investigate how such an immaterial entity was able to move matter. Once again, the 
assumption of the voluntarist was that there can be nothing in the nature or essence of 
matter itself which makes it impossible for God to choose to make it inherently active.  
 
This brings us to Harrison’s final objection to voluntarism—that the emphasis upon 
the capricious and random nature of God’s interaction with the world is incompatible 
with the undeniably rich tradition of natural theology.
47
 But the alliance between 
voluntarism and empiricism which I’ve just outlined, brief as it is, is clearly highly 
conducive to the natural theological enterprise. If you want to know something about 
God beyond what you can learn from revelation, you must study his creation. 
Voluntarism not only supports natural theology, it effectively requires it. 
 
Anyway, by the time I had read up to this point in Harrison’s critique I was getting 
increasingly impatient to see how he intended to account for the differences between, 
say, Leibniz and Clarke (as manifested in their famous epistolary exchange via 
Princess Caroline) without reference to the different approaches of the intellectualist 
and the voluntarist. Having read Harrison’s comments so far, I still had no idea how 
he was going to do this. It was with some dismay, therefore, that I realised that I’d 
reached the end of the article, and that this crucial aspect of the story was left 
unexamined.  
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Accordingly, I was delighted to see, a couple of years later, that Harrison had turned 
his attention this way once again in an article concentrating this time on the issue of 
Newton and voluntarism.
48
 I immediately assumed that he had been saving his 
discussion of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence for separate treatment in this article. 
But, alas, I was disappointed once more. Harrison certainly mentions this 
correspondence here and there throughout the Newton article but he does not examine 
it systematically, and seems oblivious to the fact, as he denies that Newton was a 
voluntarist, that the correspondence reveals, above all else, a clash between the 
differing worldviews of the voluntarist and the intellectualist.
49
 
 
Similarly to his earlier more general case, Harrison prefers to examine whether 
Newton can be seen as a voluntarist in his theology, by considering whether he 
conforms to four “claims” which Harrison discerns in the modern promoters of the 
voluntarism and science thesis. At the outset, Harrison announces that Newton can 
only be said to have subscribed to two of these claims and that in subscribing to these 
two “he was simply asserting what virtually every other seventeenth-century 
philosopher held, including those not usually numbered amongst the voluntarists.”50 
 
We have already seen, when examining the quotation from Newton’s “Of the 
Church”, that Harrison believes that, with regard to moral laws, Newton clearly aligns 
himself with intellectualists, rather than voluntarists. He reiterates that claim here with 
the help of another quotation, in which Newton declares that God, “freely willing 
good things”, always acts in accordance with the laws he himself has set down, 
“except where it is good to act otherwise”. Seizing on the first phrase, Harrison takes 
this to mean that “God thus wills good things—things are not good because God wills 
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them.” But a voluntarist would never have been able to say that God freely wills bad 
things, or even that he freely wills indifferent things. The point is that what God freely 
wills, that is to say, what God wills without any constraints on his freedom of 
operation are (by definition) good things.
51
 
 
With regard to Newton’s suggestion that God can deviate from his own laws “where it 
is good to act otherwise”, Harrison again insists that God is here guided by what is 
good, not by his “inscrutable will”. But it seems to me that Newton is referring to 
miracles here, and is alluding to what is usually called God’s ordained power 
(potentia ordinata), a short-hand reference to the fact that God constrains himself to 
act in accordance with the laws of nature and other regularities he imposed on the 
world at its creation. For the intellectualist, and for Descartes (whatever his position 
might be said to be), God’s submergence of his power into the potentia ordinata 
manifested in his creation rigidly constrains him henceforth, and miraculous 
interventions are declared (by the intellectualists) to be impossible. For the 
voluntarist, by contrast, God’s potentia ordinata merely represents a self-denying 
ordinance, which he can choose to over-ride at any time. So, for Newton, God acts 
“according to accurate laws, as being the foundation and cause of the whole of nature, 
except where it is good to act otherwise.” The question immediately arises, however, 
as to why God might choose to over-ride the normal course of nature—what are the 
exceptions which might lead God to “act otherwise” than in accordance with the laws 
he originally laid down? Clearly, the voluntarist would not suggest, in response to this 
question, that God might do this on a whim (remember, the use of the term “arbitrary” 
in discussions of voluntarism does not mean “random and capricious”52), nor that God 
might do it for evil purposes. He might choose to do it, for example, to prove his 
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existence to doubters, or in the case of the miracles of Jesus to impress upon 
onlookers that God was here incarnated in human form. In short, as Newton (the 
voluntarist) said in the manuscript under consideration, God might choose to perform 
a miracle where it was good to do so.
53
 
 
Harrison discusses the concept of God’s potentia ordinata, and the concomitant 
concept of potentia absoluta, in the penultimate section of his paper, and in so doing 
returns to this same quotation.
54
 Needless to say, while discussing this quotation in the 
context of the distinction between God’s absolute and ordained powers, Harrison 
offers an alternative reading to the one I have just offered above. According to 
Harrison, the overriding of physical laws of nature, in the case of a miracle, “is not an 
abrogation of anything that God himself has ordained” but is merely an unusual or 
untypical event that might seem miraculous to the onlooker, but is nevertheless 
explicable in natural terms. In other words, a miracle does not have to be explained 
solely in terms of God’s absolute power, overriding his ordained power, but can be 
seen as part of the general course of nature (albeit a very rare and unusual part), 
brought about by his ordained power.  
 
To clarify this distinction, consider the famous example of Shadrach, Meshach, and 
Abednego in Nebuchadnezzar’s fiery furnace.55 God might have ensured that the three 
boys were not burned in the flames simply by saying “Let not the boys be burned”, as 
he had said “Let there be light” at the creation, and there was light. This would be a 
case of God’s absolute power overriding his ordained power, by which fire always 
burns. Alternatively, God might have ensured that the boys were not burned by 
contriving from the creation that at breakfast on the crucial day they were going to eat 
 23 
something, or a marvellous combination of things, that would affect their metabolism 
in such a way that they would perhaps sweat a special substance which protected them 
from burning (it is implicit in this account that this special sudor is held to operate in a 
natural way, and would protect anyone from fire if it could be bottled!). This would be 
an example of a miracle produced within the terms of God’s ordained power, without 
any need to consider his direct intervention with overriding absolute power.
56
 It may 
have been brought about by secondary causes but it still counts as a miracle by dint of 
the fact that it brought about circumstances specially required by God. 
 
According to this latter possibility, then, a miracle can be something which takes 
place in accordance with the course of nature. Of course, the general course of nature 
in question will involve something which happens extremely infrequently, or indeed 
once only. The classic Newtonian example here would be the view that the Noachian 
flood was brought about by the passing near the earth of a massive comet.
57
 Here we 
have a miraculous event which is nevertheless brought about by a comet endlessly 
orbiting the sun since the creation, and whose movements conformed to the universal 
principle of gravitation, and whose effects are entirely natural when they come close 
enough to the earth to have significant consequences. 
 
Harrison has insisted that Newton’s concept of miracle does not rely on the 
intervention of God’s absolute power, but is always explicable in terms of God’s 
ordained power.
58
 For the most part, I believe Harrison is essentially right about this 
(although I believe there is some evidence that Newton was not always as consistent 
as Harrison would like him to have been).
59
 Unlike Harrison, however, I find this 
concept of miracles perfectly compatible with voluntarist theology. There is nothing 
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in voluntarism, after all, that precludes explanation of miracles in terms of secondary 
causes. On the contrary, the emphasis upon explanation a posteriori, which affiliates 
voluntarist theology with empiricist approaches to an understanding of the physical 
world, would lead us to expect an explanation of miracles, wherever possible, in terms 
of secondary causes. In the case of the three boys in the fiery furnace, we can imagine 
a ‘Newtonian’ onlooker wishing to take samples of their sweat after they come out of 
the furnace, or scrutinising no end of other possible factors, with a view to explaining 
how the miracle occurred—not to explain the miracle away, but to understand by 
what secondary means God wrought the miracle.  
 
Harrison seems to want to reserve the interpretation of miracles entirely in terms of 
God’s ordained power as somehow incompatible with voluntarist theology. But, as far 
as I can make out, he tries to do this simply by suggesting that the proponents of the 
voluntarism and science thesis always claim, firstly that miracles are brought about 
only by God’s absolute power, and secondly that God’s absolute power is always 
manifested in terms of God’s direct intervention. If there are such proponents of the 
voluntarism and science thesis out there, then they are wrong, and Harrison is right to 
take them to task. Newton was never committed to the view that miracles were cases 
of primary causation by God himself, as we can see from his speculations about the 
purposes of comets. Having said that, there is evidence to suggest that he did not 
commit himself either to the view that miracles could only be performed through 
God’s ordained power. Part of the evidence for this would be the quotation we have 
already considered, where Newton says that God operates “with all things according 
to accurate laws, as being the foundation and the cause of the whole of nature, except 
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where it is good to act otherwise” [my emphasis].60 Consider also his very famous 
pronouncement in the wonderfully rich final Query in the Opticks that God  
is more able by his Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform 
Sensorium, and therefore to form and reform the Parts of the Universe, than 
we are by our Will to move the Parts of our own Bodies.
61
 
 
The fact remains, pace Peter Harrison, that there is a world of difference between 
Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, who all wanted to deny the possibility of miracles on 
philosophical grounds,
62
 and Newton who was explicit in allowing them, and would 
certainly have wanted to deny the possibility of establishing on a priori grounds that 
God could not perform miracles.
63
 Certainly, Newton’s position was a hard one to 
defend in coherent philosophical terms, and may even have been ultimately 
untenable,
64
 but the ‘logic’ (I do not say “inexorable logic”) of his voluntarist 
theology would have made him shy away from any claims that seemed to 
circumscribe the omnipotence of God (such as denying that God could perform a 
miracle), just as his commitment to natural philosophy would have made him shy 
away from rescinding secondary causation and glibly invoking primary causation.
65
 
Accordingly, Newton threaded a fine line between his commitment to the unrestrained 
omnipotence of God and to the belief that God usually operated in terms of secondary 
causes. Indeed, it might further be noted that the lack of philosophical cogency in 
Newton’s attitude to miracles is in itself support for the claims that he was a 
voluntarist in his theology. Intellectualist theology is generally characterised in 
rigorous philosophical terms, and has been represented by powerful philosophical 
thinkers like Descartes (if I may be allowed to include him as an intellectualist), 
Spinoza, and Leibniz.
66
 Voluntarist theology, by contrast, was defended by those who 
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were much less enthralled by philosophical arguments, and by those who refused to 
allow reason to dictate to theology (and indeed in the Middle Ages, the voluntarist 
approach could even be said to be characteristic of anti-intellectual groups in the 
Church, those who perhaps admired Bernard of Clairvaux more than they did Peter 
Abelard).
67
 
 
Anyway, being blissfully unaware of my own preoccupations as an expectant reader, 
Harrison never did turn, in either of his papers, to a consideration of the major 
disputes in the history of science which hinged, at least partly, upon the differences 
between voluntarist and intellectualist theology. So, let me turn now to a brief look at 
those I have in mind. My aim in doing this is not to suggest that every voluntarist and 
every intellectualist thought the same way, and subscribed to exactly the same 
worldview (the intellectualist Henry More, for example, wanted to allow the existence 
of void space because he saw it as a clear example of immaterial being, but the 
intellectualist Leibniz would not allow the existence of vacuum
68
). Rather, my aim is 
simply to demonstrate that we cannot fully understand the disputes in question unless 
we recognise the fact that the protagonists were participants in a long tradition, not 
just in natural philosophy, but also in Christian theology. Let me here make explicit, 
therefore, what is implicit throughout this next part of my talk: that if Harrison really 
wants to insist that the voluntarism and science thesis should be abandoned, he needs 
to give an alternative account of what is going on in these controversies. 
 
Intellectualist versus Voluntarist Controversies 
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In each of the controversies I’m about to discuss, it seems to me that an ever-present 
pressing issue is the knowledge that atheism is a constant threat, and that, accordingly, 
the devout natural philosopher should show how his understanding of the natural 
world serves to establish the existence of God.
69
 
 
Consider, for example, the dispute between Henry More (1614-1687) and Robert 
Boyle (1627-1691) about the validity of More’s notion of a universal Spirit of Nature, 
which More held to be responsible for all activity in the physical world.
70
 At some 
point early in his career, More decided that the best way to nip atheism in the bud was 
to make plain to everyone that there really are immaterial entities, and that there really 
is a spiritual realm, and therefore that the materialism of atheism is patently foolish. 
Being a Cambridge don, More seems to have believed that the best way to make the 
existence of immaterial spirit obvious to everyone was through a bit of recondite and 
high-powered philosophizing. The closest he came to speaking to the common man 
was by gathering supposedly well-attested stories of ghosts, witches, and the like, but 
otherwise he relied on developing notions of an absolute immaterial space, showing 
how the mechanical philosophy of Descartes was inadequate for explaining all 
physical phenomena, and developing the notion of a ubiquitous Spirit of Nature which 
was required to make the mechanical philosophy fully workable.
71
 
 
More was so determined to make his claims unassailable that he invested huge effort 
in trying to persuade his contemporaries that matter was essentially inert and 
incapable of activity, and that therefore any signs of activity in nature had to be 
attributed to immaterial spirit, which was the only active substance in the world. More 
was already an intellectualist in his theology, because he equated voluntarism with 
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Calvinism, and rejected Calvinism because, according to More anyway, it denied 
absolute moral values, and seemed to suggest that anything God decreed was good, 
rather than, as More believed, that there are absolute values of goodness to which God 
had to comply.
72
 Consequently, More made sure that his account of matter and spirit 
conformed to, and reinforced, his intellectualist theology. The up-shot was that, 
according to More, the distinction between inert matter and active spirit was another 
absolute. Not even God could make matter active, to do so would involve him in a 
logical contradiction. To make matter active, is as impossible as making matter 
without any extension—it is a contradiction in terms. Given that we see activity all 
around us in the world, we have to conclude that as well as matter, there must also be 
something active, and that must be something other than matter—ineluctably 
something immaterial.
73
 
 
With regard to everyday physical phenomena, More developed the notion of the Spirit 
of Nature, which he described as the vicarious power of God in the world, thereby 
maintaining God’s transcendence, while still contriving to show that even everyday 
physical phenomena testify to his existence. More even went so far as to provide his 
own accounts of various experiments recounted by Robert Boyle, to show how these 
experimental phenomena could only be understood on the assumption that a Spirit of 
Nature was at work.
74
 
 
It was at this point that Boyle stepped in with his Hydrostatical discourse occasioned 
by the objections of Dr Henry More (1672). Now, of course, Boyle was keen to 
dismiss More’s bad science, and to show that the Spirit of Nature was not required to 
account for the various experimental results More discussed. But, what’s interesting 
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for our purposes is that Boyle didn’t leave it at that. It is all too obvious that Boyle 
wanted to dissociate himself from the underlying theology that was manifest in 
More’s writings. “Truth ought to be pleaded for only by Truth”, Boyle insisted, 
so I take that which the Doctor contends for to be evincible in the rightest way 
of proceeding by a person of far less learning than He, without introducing any 
precarious Principle… 
Boyle went on to point out that, after all, “the generality of Heathen Philosophers 
were convinc’d of the being of a Divine Architect of the World” even though they 
believed the world was “managed in a meer Physical way according to the General 
Laws settled among things Corporeal, acting upon one another.” They did not have to 
ground their belief in a supposed Spirit of Nature.
75
 
 
Boyle did not permit himself to indulge in extended theological discussion in the 
Hydrostatical discourse, but he returned to this theme in his Free enquiry into the 
vulgarly received notion of nature, which he finally published after years of delay in 
1686. Boyle attacked many different antagonists in this book, but he clearly had More 
in mind when he focussed upon those who believe Nature is  
an Immaterial Substance… the Grand Author, of the Motion of Bodies, (and 
that, especially in such familiar Phaenomena, as the Ascension of Water in 
Pumps,… the running of it through Siphons, and I know not how many 
others).
76
 
 
Boyle’s Free enquiry is a protracted attempt to examine and refute all the different 
philosophies, and all the more popular ways of thinking, in which nature itself seems 
to supplant God and to be used to explain physical phenomena. During the course of 
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this enterprise, therefore, Boyle can hardly refrain from presenting his own account of 
the nature of Providence, the nature of God’s relationship to the world. In so doing, he 
consistently presents what I feel justified in calling “an unmistakeably voluntarist 
position”. So, shortly after More has argued in print (1682) that God must act in 
accordance with  
mutual Respects and Relations eternal and immutable, and in order of Nature 
antecedent to any Understanding either created or uncreated. 
Boyle goes into print (1686) to insist that:  
God is a most Free Agent, and Created the World, not out of necessity, but 
voluntarily, having fram’d It, as he pleas’d and thought fit, at the beginning of 
Things, when there was no Substance but Himself, and consequently no 
Creature, to which He could be oblig’d, or by which he could be limited.77 
 
 
But Boyle wasn’t the only one to take exception to More’s intellectualist theology. 
Richard Baxter (1615-1691) had been quicker off the mark than Boyle, and had 
replied to More’s major statement of intellectualist theology published in 1682 within 
a matter of months. Remarkably, the pretext here was to defend the idiosyncratic 
matter theory of the physician and natural philosopher, Francis Glisson (1599?-1677). 
Glisson’s Treatise on the energetic nature of substance (1672) had argued on 
empiricist grounds that matter was not merely active, but that it actually displayed a 
complex ‘life’ of its own manifested in three faculties: perceptive, appetitive, and 
motive.  For More this was  
not only a mistake but a mischief, it implying that the Virtus Appetitiva and 
Perceptiva, may be in a substance though Material which betrays much of the 
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succours that Philosophy affords to Religion in the points of the Existence of a 
God and Immortality of the Soul.
78
 
 
Similarly, it becomes clear pretty quickly that Baxter’s concern is not really to defend 
the complexities of Glisson’s matter theory, but to denounce what he saw as More’s 
philosophically-based circumscription of God’s omnipotence. Consider for example:  
I confess I am too dull to be sure that God cannot endue matter itself with the 
formal virtue of Perception: That you say the Cartesians hold the contrary, and 
that your writings prove it, certifieth me not… That Almighty God cannot 
make perceptive living Matter, and that by informing it without Mixture [i.e. 
without adding a separate active—immaterial—substance to it], I cannot 
prove, or I think you: Where is the Contradiction that makes it impossible?
79
 
 
This parting question must have been especially annoying to More, since much of his 
printed output since the early 1660s had been devoted to showing that there was 
indeed a contradiction in making matter active. It was only by establishing that there 
is a logical contradiction in the notion of active matter that More could declare it to be 
impossible for God, without detracting from God’s omnipotence. Philosophers and 
theologians alike were agreed that it did not detract from God’s omnipotence to 
declare that he could not do what was logically impossible.
80
 What this meant in 
practice was that intellectualist theologians had to establish on philosophical grounds 
that certain physical phenomena were conceptually impossible. In More’s case, active 
matter had to be as impossible as non-extended matter, otherwise his attempt to 
establish the necessity for active spirits in the world could not run. More evidently 
believed he had succeeded in this, but obviously Baxter was no more persuaded than 
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Boyle had been.
81
 For Baxter, however, More’s view threatened sound religion by 
making philosophical considerations take precedence over theology, or, more simply, 
by unjustifiably (as far as Baxter was concerned) denying God’s omnipotence. 
 
 
The same disagreement about what is and what is not conceptually impossible lies at 
the root of the controversy over thinking matter between Edward Stillingfleet (1635-
1699), Bishop of Worcester, and John Locke (1632-1704).
82
 This arose from Locke’s 
sceptical discussion “Of the Extent of Human Knowledge” in Book IV of the Essay.83 
It is important to note that Locke never affirms that matter can think. His point is that, 
in spite of our presuppositions that what thinks inside of us is something immaterial, it 
is perfectly possible for God to make matter capable of thinking. Significantly, as well 
as referring to God, Locke also talks in terms of “Omnipotency”; we cannot tell, he 
says at one point, “whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter 
fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think”, and later he asks who could “have the 
confidence to conclude, that Omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to 
a substance which has the modification of solidity.” 84  
 
Stillingfleet was by no means a dedicated follower of Henry More’s but he evidently 
agreed with More that “the great ends of religion and morality are best secured by 
proofs of the immortality of the soul from its nature and properties.”85 In his dispute 
with Locke, therefore, he wanted it to be taken for granted that matter was by its very 
nature incapable of being active in its own right. If activity signifies the operation of 
immaterial substance then we are on the way to proving the immortality of the soul 
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based on its inherent nature, but this is jeopardized if Locke allows the concept of 
thinking matter. 
 
The fact that Stillingfleet did take it for granted that matter was essentially inactive 
perhaps suggests that intellectualism was the dominant theology in the Anglican 
Church, but this wasn’t going to sway Locke: 
The question is, whether God can, if he please, bestow on any parcel of matter, 
ordered as he thinks fit, a faculty of perception and thinking. You say, you 
“look upon a mistake herein to be of dangerous consequence as to the great 
ends of religion and morality.” If this be so, my lord, I think one may well 
wonder why your lordship has brought no arguments to establish the truth 
itself… [T]he world has reason to conclude there is little to be said against that 
proposition which is to be found in my book,
86
 concerning the possibility that 
some parcels of matter might be so ordered by Omnipotence, as to be endued 
with a faculty of thinking, if God so pleased; since your lordship’s concern for 
the promoting the great ends of religion and morality has not enabled you to 
produce one argument against a proposition that you think of so dangerous 
consequence to them.
87
 
 
In so far as the Bishop does offer an argument, Locke elsewhere suggests, it is only to 
declare the inertness of matter to be an essential property. But this, Locke points out, 
is only to protect himself from the charge of denying God’s omnipotence: 
Let us, therefore, if you please, suppose the form of your argumentation right, 
and that your lordship means, “God cannot”: and then, if your argument be 
good, it proves, “That God could not give to Balaam’s ass a power to speak to 
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his master, as he did, for the want of rational discourse being natural to that 
species”; it is but for your lordship to call it an essential property, and then 
God cannot change the essential properties of things, their nature remaining, 
whereby it is proved, “That God cannot, with all his omnipotency, give to an 
ass a power to speak, as Balaam’s did.”88 
 
It seems to me, therefore, that if we wish to understand this controversy, we need to 
be aware of the fundamental differences between intellectualist and voluntarist 
theologies, and how these affect the philosophical positions of their subscribers. If 
Stillingfleet does not offer explicit arguments against Locke’s position, it is because 
he is assuming that his readers already know his position and the reasons for it. 
Likewise, Locke does not have to enter into a theological preamble to set up his own 
position; he can simply jump straight to a discussion of God’s omnipotence, knowing 
that many of his readers, fellow subscribers to theological voluntarism, will already be 
predisposed to agree with him.  
 
 
This brings me, finally, to the controversy between Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. The 
dispute here is very rich and complex, and is further complicated by Newton’s 
implacable hatred of Leibniz, which makes him unwilling to concede anything (or to 
allow Clarke to concede anything) to Leibniz. But there are marked similarities 
between this dispute and the earlier ones we have just looked at. As with the dispute 
between More and Boyle, much of it concerns the details of natural philosophy, in 
particular the nature of space, and the possibility of void, but it is easy to see that 
these are bound up with the theological positions of the two sides. Furthermore, these 
 35 
theological positions are also bound up with differing beliefs as to how best to refute 
atheism. 
 
As is well known, Newton generally favoured the strategy of leaving some physical 
phenomena unexplained, to make it possible to invoke a God of the gaps. In this, he 
was setting his own physics up as more godly, more religiously sound, than the 
Cartesian philosophy which he saw as “made on purpose to be the foundations of 
infidelity”89 To emphasise the anti-atheist point, of his philosophy he even suggested 
that, unlike the Cartesian system where God was only required at the very beginning, 
in his system God’s intervention was required in an on-going way to ensure its steady 
continuation. It was this which led Leibniz to scornfully declaim in the opening salvo 
of the correspondence, that “God Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to 
time: otherwise it would cease to move.”90 
 
Like More, Leibniz seems to think that the best way to persuade the common man to 
abandon his increasingly ungodly ways is to provide him with recondite but none the 
less forceful arguments about the nature of God. Newton’s God, as far as Leibniz is 
concerned, is too inadequate to carry any force of conviction. As far as Clarke is 
concerned, however, Leibniz’s God is too much a philosophical construct, and not 
enough of a living presence in the world. It is Leibniz’s position which is likely to 
lead to atheism:  
The notion of the world’s being a great machine, going on without the 
interposition of God, as a clock continues to go without the assistance of a 
clockmaker; is the notion of materialism and fate, and tends, (under pretence 
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of making God a supra-mundane intelligence,) to exclude providence and 
God’s government in reality out of the world.91 
 
It’s easy to see Clarke’s point. Leibniz’s God is, to use a modern idiom, “stitched up” 
by Leibniz so that he can only do what Leibniz requires him to do. For example, in a 
discourse worthy of Dr Pangloss, Leibniz shows why God cannot allow a vacuum: 
I lay it down as a principle, that every perfection, which God could impart to 
things without derogating from their other perfections, has actually been 
imparted to them. Now let us fancy a space wholly empty. God could have 
placed some matter in it, without derogating in any respect from all other 
things: therefore he has actually placed some matter in that space: therefore 
there is no space wholly empty: therefore all is full.
92
 
 
This is bound up, of course, with Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, by which 
single principle, Leibniz says, “one may demonstrate the being of God, and all the 
other parts of metaphysics or natural theology”.93 
 
Much to Leibniz’s annoyance, however, Clarke insists on saying that the sufficient 
reason for things might simply be “the mere will of God.”94 In one of his letters to 
Princess Caroline, Leibniz makes it clear that when Clarke “claims that something can 
happen by a mere will of God without any motive”, he can’t tell whether Clarke 
genuinely fails to understand the principle of sufficient reason because of his lack of 
philosophical acuity, or whether he is merely wilfully pretending not to see the point. 
Leibniz himself is never in any doubt, as he says in another letter to Caroline, “that 
even God cannot choose without having a reason for this choice.”95 
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When writing to Clarke, however, Leibniz tries to insist that he does allow God 
freedom of choice, although he cannot bring himself to do so without maintaining that 
God is directed by his reason: 
The author objects against me, that if we don’t admit this [God’s] simple and 
mere will, we take away from God the power of choosing, and bring in a 
fatality. But the quite contrary is true. I maintain that God has the power of 
choosing, since I ground that power upon the reason of a choice agreeable to 
his wisdom. 
Leibniz even goes on to admit this is a fatality of a kind, but a kind which can be said 
to reveal the “wisest order of providence”, and is very different from “blind fatality or 
necessity”. 96 But this still isn’t good enough for Clarke, who in his reply insists that  
the will of God can freely choose and determine itself, without any external 
cause to impel it; and that ’tis a perfection in God, to be able so to do…97 
 
Again, Leibniz tries to clarify the issue, but in so doing he makes it all the more clear 
that God, according to intellectualist precepts, is constrained by truths which are 
somehow independent of God and co-eternal with him: 
God is never determined by external things, but always by what is in himself; 
that is, by his knowledge of things, before any thing exists without himself.
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God is determined by what he knows to be true even before he creates anything. This 
is a classic intellectualist position, opposed by the voluntarist claim that God can 
create arbitrarily, unconstrained by any supposedly eternal uncreated truths. As Clarke 
says, of Leibniz’s position:  
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This argument, if it were good, would prove that whatever God can do, he 
cannot but do… Which is making him no governor at all, but a mere necessary 
agent, that is, indeed no agent at all, but mere fate and nature and necessity.
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It is Leibniz, therefore, who offers hostages to atheists, not Newton with his 
watchmaker God. 
 
In his final reply to Leibniz (which remained unanswered due to Leibniz’s death), 
Clarke exploited a traditional voluntarist attack on intellectualism, namely that it 
depended upon the assumption that our reason is equivalent to God’s, and that what 
we think is reasonable, must also be held to be reasonable by God. Clarke exposed 
this in another attack on Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason: 
If it is possible for God to make or to have made two pieces of matter alike, so 
that the transposing in situation would be perfectly indifferent; this learned 
author’s notion of a sufficient reason falls to the ground. To this he answers; 
not, (as his argument requires,) that ’tis impossible for God to make two pieces 
exactly alike; but, that ’tis not wise for him to do so. But how does he know, it 
would not be wise for God to do so? Can he prove that it is not possible God 
may have wise reasons for creating many parts of matter exactly alike in 
different parts of the universe? The only reason he alleges, is that then there 
would not be a sufficient reason to determine the will of God, which piece 
should be placed in which situation. 
As Clarke points out, this last point is an “express begging of the question”, and 
serves only to lock God back into conforming to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient 
reason.
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I said before embarking on this brief survey of voluntarist/intellectualist controversies 
that if Harrison really thinks we should abandon the voluntarism and science thesis, 
then he should indicate how we are to understand the differences expressed in these 
controversies, and others like them. In view of the evident similarities between the 
positions taken up by each of the sides in these disputes, it is surely unsatisfactory to 
say that there is no common intellectual background against which they are to be 
understood. It seems highly unconvincing to suggest that the antagonists simply 
developed their respective positions afresh each time. The only plausible alternative, 
therefore, if we are to abandon the voluntarism and science thesis, is to provide a 
different ‘key’ for revealing, and helping us to understand, the common background 
to these controversies.  
 
In fact, Professor Harrison has already offered a replacement reading of these 
matters.
101
 Indeed, it seems fair to say that he has developed his rejection of the 
voluntarism and science thesis in the light of his own alternative historiographical 
claim. If I am to complete my defence of the role of voluntarism in the development 
of early modern science, therefore, I must finally take notice of Professor Harrison’s 
proposed substitute schema.  
 
Postlapsarian Expectations and Voluntarist Theology 
 
In his most recent book, The Fall of man and the foundations of science, Peter 
Harrison has offered a new and highly provocative account of the theological 
background to the development of the experimental method in the early modern 
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period.
102
 Harrison suggests that the revival of the Augustinian view of original sin in 
the Reformation period provides an explanation of the development of the 
experimental method which is “far more plausible” than that offered by the 
voluntarism and science thesis. According to the Augustinian view postlapsarian 
humanity was simply incapable of knowing all that Adam had known before the Fall. 
When John Donne lamented in his Anatomie of the world of 1611 that “All is lost”, 
his specific illustrations of that fact included the position of the Earth in the world 
system, the number of the elements, and knowledge of the correspondences of things 
in the chain of being, but what was also lost according to Augustinian theology was 
the intellectual capability of determining these matters.
103
 Accordingly, Harrison 
wrote, for early modern thinkers, 
Experimental natural philosophy was a means of imposing discipline on both 
an errant world and on fallen human minds. The insistence on the particular 
virtues on the part of the natural philosopher, the use of artificial instruments, 
the manipulation of nature out of its normal course, the modest goals of 
probabilistic knowledge, all represent a response to the corruption of nature 
and the inherent infirmity of human minds.
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The first thing to say, here, is that I do not deny the validity of Harrison’s claims 
about the role of thinking about original sin in the origins of the experimental method. 
On the contrary, I find them highly suggestive, extremely persuasive, and genuinely 
enlightening. It is certainly significant, as Harrison points out, that “the appearance of 
more pessimistic views about human cognitive powers were historically prior to the 
development of the empirical methods of the early modern natural philosophers”, and 
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what’s more, they were only just prior. A reading of Harrison’s Fall of man should 
certainly leave the reader in no doubt that 
The birth of modern experimental science was not attended with a new 
awareness of the powers and capacities of human reason, but rather the 
opposite – a consciousness of the manifold deficiencies of the intellect, of the 
misery of the human condition, and of the limited scope of scientific 
achievement.
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And that, accordingly, “ideas of the Fall played a major role in both the origins of 
modern empiricism and in subsequent attempts to legitimate experimentalism.”106 It 
seems to me that it is only a matter of time before Harrison’s thesis is recognised as 
making an indispensable contribution to our understanding of the development of 
early modern science. 
 
It is beyond question, therefore, that Harrison’s account of the role of theological 
ideas about the Fall in the origins of modern science should take its place alongside 
other accounts of the various different factors involved in the emphasis upon 
empiricism and the development of the experimental method. It is important to note, 
however, that the suggestion is not that Harrison’s thesis should replace all other 
accounts, but that it should take its place alongside them. As we all know, history 
seldom, if ever, proceeds in accordance with single, isolated causes. It would be very 
odd, therefore, if Professor Harrison were to suggest that his new account should lead 
to the abandonment of, say, the scholar-and-craftsman thesis.
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 In spite of the 
undoubted richness and power of Harrison’s new thesis, it still strikes me as odd to 
call for an abandonment of the voluntarism and science thesis.  
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Presumably Harrison would want to draw a distinction between the scholar and 
craftsman thesis and the voluntarism and science thesis in so far as the former has 
little or nothing in common with his own thesis, and so should be acknowledged as 
addressing a set of genuinely alternative causal factors, whereas the voluntarism and 
science thesis can be reduced to an aspect of the Harrison thesis. In other words, 
Harrison would want to say that, in so far as the voluntarism and science thesis has 
any merit, it derives from the fact that it is merely a partially understood rendering of 
concerns about the postlapsarian incapacity of human intellects:  
It is not so much that God could have ordered nature in any way he chose 
which is significant for the development of an experimental approach to 
nature, but rather the fact that the Fall separated human beings from God and 
corrupted their minds. Nature itself had fallen, moreover, deviating from the 
original divine plan and becoming less intelligible.
108
  
 
I believe Harrison’s attitude here is coloured by what I have suggested throughout this 
paper is a tendency to misread the voluntarism and science thesis (although, as I have 
freely admitted, these misreadings often seem to derive from misrepresentations of the 
thesis by its own proponents!). Even at the point in his discussion which I have just 
quoted, there is a strong suggestion of this. In The Fall of man Harrison concludes his 
brief dismissal of the relevance of voluntarist theology like this: “If the manner of 
God’s direction of the operations of nature is inscrutable to human minds, this is on 
account of the limitations of the latter, rather than the irrationality of the former.”109  
 
Any claim that Christian thinkers believed in the irrationality of God deserves to be 
treated with nothing but contempt, and Harrison would be right to reject the 
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voluntarism and science thesis tout court and tout de suite if that was properly a part 
of its claims. But the irrationality of God never was an aspect of voluntarist theology. 
To reject the claim that God’s operation in creation can be reconstructed by human 
reason is not the same as saying that God operated irrationally. To be sure, Harrison 
could respond at this point that the inability of human reason to “think God’s thoughts 
after him” is an aspect of Augustinian views about the postlapsarian state of 
humankind. I shall return to this point in a moment, but for now suffice it to say that I 
do not deny this, but it is a deflection away from the point I am trying to make. I 
merely want to say that it is wrong to dismiss the voluntarism and science thesis on 
the grounds that it requires God to be irrational, because it never did entail this 
requirement. It is my hope that I have said enough in the foregoing to undermine each 
and every one of Professor Harrison’s strictures against the voluntarism and science 
thesis, and to show, therefore, that it can stand as a least equal in historiographical 
merit alongside the Harrison thesis, and alongside the scholar and craftsman thesis, 
claims about the rise in status of mathematics, or the revival of magic, and other 
factors which have been seen as contributory to the experimental method.
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But let us return to the claim, implicit if not explicit in Professor Harrison’s recent 
book, that the voluntarism and science thesis does not merit separate consideration 
alongside his own thesis, because what some historians have discerned as voluntarist 
theology is in its essentials merely a partial understanding of the Augustinian theology 
of original sin. So that, to return to our recent example, the supposedly voluntarist 
claim that it is impossible to reconstruct God’s thinking as he decided how to create 
the world, should not be seen as a claim that God could have done as he pleased 
without any rationally dictated constraints upon his freedom of action, but rather as a 
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claim that human minds are simply incapable (after the Fall) of being able to think as 
God can think. 
 
There are two things to say about this. The first thing to say is that, essentially, I 
agree. Theology, like any system of thought, is a continuous network of ideas and 
beliefs, and just as a modern geneticist would not, and could not, simultaneously 
uphold his own beliefs about the operation of DNA in organic cells while rejecting the 
claims about the chemical interactions of substances implicit in the periodic table of 
the elements, so an early modern theologian would not compartmentalize his thought 
in such a way that he could separate his ideas on original sin from his thinking about 
the nature of God’s providence.111 I am perfectly willing to concede, therefore, that 
Harrison’s thesis throws much new light on the earlier work of historians who have 
discerned a distinction between voluntarist theology and intellectualist theology. 
Indeed, I not only concede it, I welcome it as a genuine enhancement of our historical 
understanding. Thanks to Professor Harrison’s work, we can now see that many of the 
differences between voluntarists and intellectualists can be understood in terms of 
those who took an Augustinian line, and were pessimistic about humanity’s ability to 
understand God and his creation, and those who rejected the Augustinian emphasis 
upon the debilitating nature of original sin. Nevertheless, I think it would be a mistake 
to abandon the voluntarism and science thesis. 
 
This brings me to my second point. In spite of the undoubted affiliations, or 
connections, between Harrison’s thesis and the voluntarism and science thesis, I 
believe it would be a serious mistake to abandon the latter and henceforth to discuss 
the historical scene solely in the terms proposed by Professor Harrison. I believe there 
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is a reason why the voluntarism and science thesis was first proposed in the 1930s 
while the postlapsarian dimension to the origins of the experimental method had to 
await the appearance of a historian with the thoroughness and erudition of Peter 
Harrison. Putting it simply, the relevance of attitudes to God’s providence in the 
origins of modern science, is easier to spot, especially for scholars raised in our 
secular age, than the relevance of notions of original sin. The very fact that 
theological conceptions of what God can and cannot do in the creation of the world 
were recognised as pertinent factors early in the history of the discipline of history of 
science (and were provided with the convenient labels of ‘voluntarist’ and 
‘intellectualist’ theology), is surely sufficient indication that these terms are useful in 
helping us to fully understand the development of early modern science. 
 
We do not have to confine ourselves here to vague rhetorical gesturing in favour of an 
old tradition in the historiography of science. There is a good reason to uphold the 
claim that the voluntarism and science thesis should stand shoulder to shoulder 
alongside Harrison’s thesis rather than be subsumed into it. I have repeatedly 
mentioned throughout this paper the relevance of background fears among the devout 
of the rise of atheism, and the need to counter it. Certainly, this was an important 
element in each of the controversies we looked at earlier.  
 
Our concern as historians of science is not with what was going on in mainstream 
theology at the time of the Scientific Revolution, but how issues in theology were 
taken up by natural philosophers or others whose primary concern was an 
understanding of nature. Accordingly, it is easy to see that the prime consideration of 
the “secular theologians” who Amos Funkenstein saw as emerging from the ranks of 
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the natural philosophers were chiefly concerned to prove the existence of God.
112
 As 
they tried to work out the details of their strategies for combating atheism, some chose 
to rely on what they saw as ineluctable reason to demonstrate his existence, while 
others preferred to focus directly on the details of the natural world and insist that they 
entailed an omnipotent creator. In view of what we said above about the connections 
between different aspects of systems of thought, there can be little doubt that the 
choices made here as to the best way to combat atheism could be mapped onto the 
theological concerns upon which Peter Harrison has concentrated. Presumably, those 
who chose to demonstrate God’s existence by dint of rational argument were ill-
disposed towards Augustinian pessimism about the inadequacies of the fallen human 
intellect.  
 
But, more to the point for our purposes, it was also during the development of these 
strategies for proving the existence of God, that the natural philosophers found 
themselves having to defend their theological views against the opposing camp, and 
also, more often than not, their concomitant natural philosophical views (defending 
mechanistic explanations against those involving a hylarchic principle, say, or 
defending an instrumentalist concept of gravity against a mechanistic concept of 
gravity).
113
 It was in such an arena, therefore, that the theologies which historians 
have dubbed voluntarist and intellectualist were developed. In developing these 
differing theologies our secular theologians drew upon earlier traditions in Christian 
theology, some deriving from the early Middle Ages, but they never allowed 
themselves to lose sight of the fact that they were addressing putative atheists.  
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It is the consciousness of the audience which was being addressed that led to the 
distinctiveness of these secular theologies, marking them as distinct from (although 
affiliated to) differing views on original sin. Clearly, if you wish to convince an 
atheist that he should believe in God it is futile to try to engage him in discussion of 
the niceties of St Augustine’s views on original sin and the implications of that view 
for our epistemologies, much less for the best means to our salvation. The concerns 
that Harrison so superbly delineates in his Fall of Man were crucially important 
among the devout, and within theological, or simply confessional, debate, but the 
secular theologies discerned by Foster, Lovejoy, and the subsequent commentators on 
voluntarist or intellectualist theologies were either aimed directly at the less devout, or 
were developed by lay thinkers at least conscious of the need for a theology intended 
ultimately for the ungodly. The result was a distinctive set of approaches to a limited 
range of religious issues, which deserve, pace Harrison, continued separate 
consideration by historians seeking to understand the development of early modern 
science and its relationship to religion. If we were to abandon the voluntarism and 
science thesis, and to reduce all the issues previously seen as aspects of voluntarist or 
intellectualist theologies to aspects of Augustinian or Thomist attitudes to original sin, 
I believe we would be in danger of obliterating various important nuances. The 
clearest example of this would be the anti-atheist intentions of early modern natural 
philosophers, which could hardly be brought out if their discussions were reduced to a 
concern with the effects of original sin. 
 
Perhaps there is a simpler way to characterise the difference between the theological 
issues with which Harrison is concerned, and those which I have been trying to defend 
here. The theology which Professor Harrison focuses upon was chiefly concerned 
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with the nature of man and his abilities, in particular the power of his intellect; the 
theology I am defending was concerned with the nature of God and his abilities, in 
particular the extent of his omnipotence. Although I accept that these two sets of 
concerns are not as separate as this stark characterisation of them might suggest, I 
nonetheless feel that they are sufficiently distinct on a number of levels that it would 
be a serious mistake to abandon the voluntarism and science thesis. 
 
 
Well, I have gone on too long, but I hope I have said enough to show that, Professor 
Harrison’s strictures notwithstanding, if we wish to understand the wider context of 
the early modern controversies we have considered here, we need to be aware of the 
separate traditions of voluntarist and intellectualist theology, and the respective 
preoccupations and presuppositions of their subscribers. I hope I have said enough, 
but I am all too aware that I might be in the position of poor Samuel Clarke when he 
tried in person to persuade Princess Caroline to abandon Leibniz’s philosophical 
theology and to adopt instead the Newtonian view. As Caroline subsequently wrote to 
Leibniz:  
He talked to me a very long time in an effort to convert me to his opinion and 
wasted his breath.
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